Observer or Participant: Can the invisible hand sow the seeds of its own destruction?

As discussed in the previous post, companies in rapidly developing markets need to run effective idea factories - organizations of extremely talented and motivated humans arranged to bring new ideas to market. While markets often reach a "peacetime" state of equilibrium in which a few key winners dominate, the transitional "wartime" state is often marked by intense competition (e.g. the Browser Wars or Cloud Wars).

This competition happens between competing idea factories as capital gets injected into a company and intellectual property comes out the other side until one of the factories achieves some kind of "moat," at which point the war concludes and the winner has a defensible business which can produce attractive profits for a long time.

Different organizations have different inherent talent - as described by Matthew Ball, Disney and HBO regularly outperform Netflix in the efficiency of their content production. And that talent is distributed between employees and the organization. But regardless of the distribution, no matter how talented the organization may be, unlike a traditional company, IP-driven companies at war still rent huge percentages of their idea factory from their employees and depend on that talent retention to continue fighting.

So what happens as the market gets involved? Investors look into the future and pick a winner - the company which they believe will emerge as one of the dominant "peacetime" players. They do this, often, by looking at momentum and velocity: which organization is moving more quickly, taking more ground, developing more features - which idea factory is more efficient?

Then they discount that victory into the present (with a historically and unsustainably low interest rate) so that capital flows into the winner. This creates a uniquely low cost of capital for the presumed victor, all but ensuring their victory. Perception becomes reality as optimistic prognostications become the assumptions that drive present value calculations. In this model, victory itself is a self-fulfilling prophecy.

But underneath all of this lies a key question about incentives: in a war that depends on human capital, where that same human capital is compensated with stock in the enterprise, what happens when investors pay the factory workers so much for the factory's potential that the market shifts from playing the passive role of an observer into an active role, as a participant.

What happens when individual employees - not founders, or even executives, begin taking home 5-10x more than they expected? Do they continue to fight with the hunger that is necessary to win? Do they keep burning with the passion that is required for true innovation? Or do they, individually and collectively, take their foot off the gas? Does the hyper-capitalization of the idea factory perversely result in a factory that becomes less capable of victory even as it becomes more expensive?

And if so, what does that mean for capitalism - if capital can destroy value, how can we insulate small teams from capital and enable them to commit to long-term change, long-term success? What types of compensation mechanisms can we develop that are more stable, that result in more self-binding, more Ulysses Pacts where liquidity is available, but without the corrosive effect of hyper-liquidity? How could we design a compensation system in which the workers had stakes in their outcomes even in excess of their investors, where by deferring liquidity today, collective organizations could agree to provide liquidity only after victory was assured?

Today, we distribute the spoils of a future war to a present-day army, and too few people have thought through the unintended consequences as newly rich soldiers quietly leave the field in the midst of battle.